1) Introduction
Corporate power in Britain is multifaceted, multilayered, and geographically structured.
In contrast to the classic rise of the capitalist class, the established landed aristocracy was not overthrown in Britain but became embedded in its ascendancy, an articulation strongly marking institutional forms of power to this day (Anderson 1964 however. The availability of data and the potentially strategic importance of a director's role has led attention primarily towards interlocking directorships (Aaronovitch 1956 , Useem 1984 , Windolf 2002 , while the mining of biographical databases provides an entry-point into elite schools, clubs and social circles (Sampson 1962) . But these are only limited components of the taxonomy of multiple layers of inter-organisational bonds proposed by Scott and Griff (1984) as constituting elite cohesion, let alone extended to national and transnational dimensions (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 about here]
This paper takes a modest taxonomic step through these layers, reviewing and extending Scott's periodic studies of British director interlocks, temporarily and methodologically, then considering the pattern of interlocks in the context of transnational influences on the British economy.
2) Studies of the British corporate elite
There is a rich vein of historical analysis of the development of British capitalism, sifting archives to meticulously document the rise of a wide variety of industries and the large firms that have come to dominate them. While much of this research initially considered the relatively slow growth of British corporate capitalism after pioneering industrialisation, as compared to the US and Germany, a re-examination from the 1970s highlighted the early and persistent internationalisation of British industrial firms.
British merchant houses, originally establishing offshore agencies to facilitate international trade, diversified from the early 19 th century into episodic banking, construction, plantations and manufacturing; Jardine Matheson and P&O originate from this time. Specialist companies followed the merchants offshore to finance and insure trade. Barings and Pheonix Insurance established US branches in the early 1800s While the pioneers of industrial expansion abroad were US, British firms followed from the 1860s with textile and steel manufacturers establishing subsidiaries in the rapidly growing, but protected, US market; by 1914, 14 of the 100 largest British manufacturing firms had overseas operations (Stopford and Turner 1985) . In all, British overseas assets increased rapidly in the second half of the 19 th century, from £1.1 billion in 1850 to £5 billion in 1874 and £11 billion in 1900, 45 per cent of the latter comprising direct investments. Total overseas assets equalled one third of national wealth and accounted for half of the world's investment stock. British capital dominated international investment through to the Second World War, accounting for 40 per cent of the total in 1939 and today still accounts for the world's second largest of overseas direct investment stock (Barratt Brown 1974 , Corley 1994 , Dunning and Archer 1987 , Edelstein 2003 , Jones 1988 , Nicholas 1983 , United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2011).
While the historical research on large firms has been largely descriptive, at times it has resonated with the delineation of articulated structures of power, most notably synthesised around the concept of 'gentlemanly capitalism' (Cain and Hopkins 2001) .
This highlights the clubbish interconnections among the landed aristocracy and the City of London as critical to the funding of rapid capitalist expansion, both as a source of strength and myopic weakness. Ingram (1984) intentions, or greater knowledge of the business environment in general.
The suggestion that interlocks provide strategically important information channels is supported by the nationally distinctive patterns of director interlocking, with the UK and US characterised by low rates of interlocking (Carroll and Fennema 2002 , Stokman, et al. 1985 , Windolf 2002 . However, while this may appear to relate to the more marketoriented capital funding in these countries , there is little explicit relationship between funding requirements and interlocking other than as a response to financial difficulties (Mizruchi and Stearns 1988) . The trend may simply reflect differences in the number of large, domestic or financial firms, and those with large minority shareholders, each of which is associated with interlocking (Carroll and Alexander 1999 , Dooley 1969 , Ornstein 1984 . At the same time, while there has been little evidence of collusive behaviour arising from these communication channels, interlocks have been associated with the diffusion of business practices, including quality management, takeover defences and political donations (Bond 2004 , Mizruchi 1996 .
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Possibly most significantly, interlocks appear to provide a general 'scan' of the business environment, important to strategic decision-making (Useem 1984) . Generalising the resource-based approach, firms may use this scanning capacity to reduce uncertainty in industries or markets where information is less transparent. Financial institutions might be expected to have larger boards and thus greater scanning capacity because of the opacity of the affairs of borrowers. Likewise, foreign-owned firms operating in a less familiar business environment and firms dependent on government concessions. Scott and Griff (1984) note how director interlocks represented only one of a multiple set of bonds that structured corporate elite cohesion, each providing a channel for exchanges and flows of money, materials and information (see Figure 1 ). Scott (1986) commences the more extensive investigation demanded by this taxonomy by supplementing director interlock studies with a consideration of ownership type, introducing the useful concept of ownership by a 'constellation of interests' (Nyman and Silberston 1978) . Such shareholdings tend to be held by institutional investors, But given the relatively well-documented international interaction of UK firms, it seems a feasible extension of Scott's work to consider the transnational influences on these drivers of elite cohesion.
3) Methods and data
A comparative cross-sectional approach is used to examine the evolution of the structure of British director interlocks over the last century. Scott's studies of the interlock structure in 1904 , 1938 and 1976 (largely reported in Scott and Griff 1984 Also excluded were limited liability partnerships, the large accounting firms whose many partners were formally recorded as directors.
For comparison with Scott's earlier findings, descriptive statistics were drawn for each cross-section, using UCINET 6.0 (Borgatti, et al. 2002) , including a component analysis and a listing of the ten most central firms each year, in terms of degree centrality.
Alternative measures of centrality, such as betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centrality were found by Scott and Griff (1984) to be highly correlated.
Following the comparison of network metrics across the five-cross sections, a listing of the ten most central firms for each period provides the basis for an historical consideration of the evolution of the director network. Scott's approach, which reviewed the industrial basis of the most central firms against an account of the economic structure at the time, is extended to consider transnational influences at each period.
In Scott's work, the relationships formed between firms by sharing a common director is considered to be a network comprising the firms alone, a 1-mode firm-to-firm network among a standard number of firms (250). However, as the relationships between firms are actually constituted by firm-director-firm linkages, the network is actually more complex, larger, and the network size varies with the number of directors involved. This complexity and richness in the network structure is lost when the network is represented solely in 1-mode terms.
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As discussed by Borgatti and Everett (1997) , it is important to account for the twomode nature of this data when normalising for network size. In Figure 1 , the normalised degree centrality of A in 1-mode terms, the proportion of the maximum possible degree, is 2/(4-1) = 0.67. But in 2-mode terms, the maximum possible degree is given by the total nodes in the other mode, so the normalised degree of A is 2/4 = 0.50. Similar arguments are given by Borgatti and Everett (1997) for betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centrality. Likewise, network density needs to account for the 2-mode nature of the data. One-mode directed data has a maximum of n(n-1) ties and undirected ties half of this, whereas in 2-mode data again the maximum ties is given by the total nodes in each other mode, n1.n2 for directed data and 2(n1.n2) for directed data. (Dekker, et al. 2007 ).
For the MRQAP procedure, a matrix was created for each variable, by taking the similarity or difference in the metric for each pair of nodes. These matrices were then compared to each other and to the differences in the dependent variable. The following model was used:
(1) Δ Centrality = α + β1 Δ Log(Revenue) + β2 Δ ROSF + β3 Δ ROCE + β4 Δ PER + β5 ΔSolvency + β6 Δ NACE + β7 Δ UK Sales percent + β8 Δ Foreign Director percent + β8 Δ Foreign-owned + μ
4) Findings
Network statistics of the director interlocks among the largest UK firms at the five timepoints are presented in Table 2 . There is remarkable stability in the number of directors The 13 London clearing banks had some interlocks with no more than 9 industrial firms.
By 1938, the largest strong component had grown to 63 firms, still centred on the City family-based merchant banks but with connections into regionally-based heavy industry, which he described as "the characteristic pattern of British finance capital" (Scott 2003, 165) . By 1976, the regional structure had been diffused by widespread small-shareholdings throughout the national economy by large financial institutions such as insurance firms and pension funds and the City firms were divided among different components. But the banks remained central to the interlocking director network. Following the financial deregulation of 1986 and increased foreign ownership, the interlock structure dissipated, with lower density, fewer bank interlocks and fewer financial-industry links by 1992.
While comparative data is not available for the first three periods, international dimensions of the network are evident from an analysis of the nationality of directors (see Table 3 ). A third of directors of the top 250 UK-registered firms in both 2006 and 2010 were resident outside the UK. These were drawn predominantly from Europe and North America, although perhaps surprisingly few from Asia, given the rapid economic growth of that region. Further disaggregation of the North American total combined with Australasia points to the continuing salience of the former British dominions in the UK's international business operations.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 4 [ Table 4 about here]
While the various measures of centrality are highly correlated in one-mode companycompany terms, when the relationships among the intermediary directors themselves are considered, that is two-mode company-director-company relations, the centrality metrics diverge. Degree centrality is weakly associated with closeness and betweenness Table   3 illustrate the divergence of the two-mode centrality measures from one-mode degree centrality, with three firms central in one-mode terms not central in two-mode terms and only two firms being on the list by virtue of their two-mode degree centrality. Rather the one-mode degree centrality appears to be a weak and imprecise proxy for the correlation of two-mode betweenness and closeness.
Whereas the one-mode measure of degree centrality draws attention to banks and consumer goods firms, in the two-mode measure international banks and resources firms are more prominent (see Table 5 ). This is via their connections to a network of well-connected directors, which are reduced to single firm-to firm relationships when translated to one-mode data. There is also considerable disruption to the top-ten in twomode degree terms from the 2008 financial crisis, with only three survivors. Consumer goods firms are more prominent in the two-mode betweenness and closeness rankings, which also see a little more survival beyond the financial crisis. In general, the survivors tend to move from prominence in terms of degree centrality towards prominence in betweenness and closeness centrality, suggesting a consolidation of the core in the wake of the crisis.
[ Table 5 about here] Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis of the 2006 and 2010 data. In both years, degree centrality was associated with revenue and the proportion of foreign directors, that is, larger firms and those with a higher proportion of foreign directors tended to have a larger number of interlocks. In 2010, degree centrality was also associated with industry, firms with higher NACE codes, that is towards finance, having more interlocks.
[ Table 6 about here]
Closeness centrality was also associated with revenue in both years. However, in 2006, closeness was also negatively associated with UK sales, that is, firms with a greater proportion of overseas sales were more likely to be closer to all other firms in the director interlock network. In 2010, however, this was not evident and it was the more solvent and domestically-owned firms that had the greatest closeness centrality. There were no significant relationships with any other financial ratio tested.
5) Discussion
Scott's pioneering research relating the director interlock structure to the changing sectoral and geographic characteristics of the UK economy is supported by the evident internationalisation of the interlock network in the 21 st century. Large, domesticallyowned firms with transnational reach, largely in the banking and resource industries, dominate the centre of the interlock network. A significant minority of the directors of these firms are drawn from overseas but this is consistent with uncertainty avoidance by internationalising firms. Further, a number of domestically-oriented consumer goods firms remain central.
While Scott and Griff (1984) In sum, the pattern of director interlocking within the UK corporate elite over the last century reflects the transition of the economy from family-based merchant capitalism to regionally-based industrialism then international banking and resources. But this does not amount to a unilateral dissolution of the national economy into a global capitalism.
Rather, the internationalisation of the largest firms remains strongly nationally based, domestically-owned, internationalisation of the directorate associated with external expansion and with a sizeable component comprising domestically-oriented consumer goods providers.
6) Conclusion
The multilayered nature of UK corporate power is evident in this examination of the changing articulation of director interlocking and transnational influences over the last century. British capitalism has been intrinsically structured by national and transnational processes from its start and the expansion of its nexus of activity from the national to global markets elides a complex articulation of corporate power that can be too readily interpreted as a diminution of national interests.
In the shadow of the United States, European Union, Japan and China, British capital remains the world's second largest overseas investor, with banking and resources firms at the heart of the global economy. Scrutiny of the structures of director interlocking over the century reveals a persistent national core among the UK corporate elite, not noticeably diminished by the shifts in the sectoral or geographical focus of economic activity.
The salience of Useem's corporate scan and generalised resource dependency models in explaining particular patterns of director interlocking is evident. While the search for oligarchic groupings amongst the corporate elite and direct firm-firm resource-exchange activities in various studies has been elusive, the value of the more generalised 17 information seeking and uncertainty avoidance to the coherence of the corporate elite should not be underestimated. Note. There was no difference in distribution if measured in terms of unique directors or total directorships. *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
